JSF Nieuws.nl

Kesteren - Deze week kwam een vernietigend rapport van het Pentagon - US only (bespaar het onze bondgenoten in Europa) - naar buiten over de ernstige ontwerpproblemen van de JSF. Op 6 april 2009 zijn de leden van de Vaste Commissie voor Defensie, aanwezig bij een officieel door de Tweede Kamer georganiseerd Ronde Tafel gesprek inzake de Vervanging F-16, hiervoor indringend door mij gewaarschuwd. Dit nog los van andere waarschuwingen (kosten per vlieguur twee keer zo hoog dan F-16 en dat productie van 4500 JSF’s een volstrekt irreëel denkbeeld zal blijken te zijn; deze waarschuwingen - goed gedocumenteerd - zullen later eveneens juist blijken).

Wil men straks beweren dat deze problemen niet waren voorzien kan dit dus gevoegelijk worden afgedaan als een pertinente leugen. Het was bekend. Er was gewaarschuwd in dit miljarden dossier (wereldwijd gaat het om honderden miljarden dollars).

Hieronder een transcriptie van dit ronde tafelgesprek in de Tweede Kamer, specifiek waar het gaat om het onderwerp “overlap ontwerp, testen, productie”.

De voorzitter:
U hebt zich vooral verdiept in de opvolging van de F-16. Dat moet ook een reden hebben?

De heer Boeder:
De reden waarom ik mij erin ben gaan verdiepen, is dat ik mij verbaasde over de gang van zaken en de onvolledigheid van informatie. De meest directe aanleiding was het gegeven dat ik vanuit mijn achtergrond systeemontwerper verschrikkelijk verbaasd was over de gigantische overlap tussen het testen en het ontwikkelen van het toestel. Dat was voor mij de aanleiding om in dit onderwerp te duiken.

De heer Boeder:
(………)
Er is vanaf de aanvang van het JSF-project sprake van een volstrekt risicovolle overlap tussen test en productie. Men volgt een risicovolle teststrategie. Hoewel slechts 1% van de testvluchten is voltooid, is de daadwerkelijke productie al begonnen. In elke andere industrie is dit ondenkbaar en in deze mate is dit ook in de luchtvaartindustrie een volstrekt unicum. Nederland komt straks te zitten met vele suboptimale toestellen met hoge upgradingskosten en operationele complicaties voor wat betreft de operationale-gereedstellingspercentages.

(………..)

De heer Boeder:
Ik ga in op de koop van de twee testtoestellen die voor de Initiële Operationele Test- en Evaluatiefase zijn bestemd. Deze fase is aantoonbaar deels niet anders dan een verkapte bijdrage aan de ontwikkelingsfase van de JSF op kosten van de Nederlandse belastingbetaler. De werkelijke operationele noodzaak ligt voor het eerste gedeelte niet daaraan ten grondslag en uitstel hoeft volstrekt geen probleem op te leveren. Immers, het hele project is drie jaar opgeschoven en ook deze fase is een stuk opgeschoven. Wat mij betreft, moeten wij eerst zekerheid over de totaliteit hebben en dan pas over deelstappen beslissen. Twee jaar uitstel kan meer zekerheid geven over prijs, kwaliteit en levertijd. Alleen op basis van openheid en eenduidige en bindende informatie is een keuze verantwoord mogelijk.

De heer Boekestijn (VVD):
Voorzitter, de heer Boeder heeft zorgen over de overlap tussen testen en ontwikkeling. Dat kan ik mij goed voorstellen. Dit komt toch wel veel vaker voor bij de ontwikkeling van vliegtuigen? Kan hij daarop verder ingaan?

De heer Boeder
Overlap tussen testen en ontwikkeling komt vaker voor, maar nooit in deze mate. Op het moment dat aan de prototypes werd gebouwd, waren de zogeheten technology readiness levels, de niveaus van technische gereedheid of rijpheid, nog volstrekt ontoereikend. Nu wordt daadwerkelijk geproduceerd, terwijl nog maar 1% van de testvlieguren is gemaakt. Dat moet zorgen baren. Dat betekent immers dat wij producten maken die nog niet het totale testprogramma hebben doorstaan. Het is niet nodig om echt alle testen afgerond te hebben voordat tot productie kan worden overgegaan. Dat is waar, maar een basistestprogramma — testen op het airframe, grondtesten, vermoeidheidstesten enzovoort — is nodig. Het is onverantwoord om al te gaan produceren als daarin nog onvoldoende inzicht is.

De voorzitter:
Dan geef ik het woord aan mevrouw Van Velzen van de SP.

Mevrouw Van Velzen (SP):
Voorzitter. Gaandeweg dat ik naar de heer Boeder aan het luisteren was, vroeg ik mij af waarom ik altijd zo blij ben met de verhalen die hij aanlevert. Los van zijn tomeloze inzet op dit dossier, is dat toch vooral omdat hij nergens verwijst naar vertrouwelijke stukken maar altijd naar openbare bronnen, zodat ik zelf kan nagaan of ik zijn analyse volg en of ik die tot mijn analyse kan maken. Heel erg dank daarvoor. Ik heb zelden de heren van Defensie aanwezig op de tribune zo lang meewarig met hun hoofd zien schudden, zien glimlachen en met elkaar zien fluisteren. Dus volgens mij moeten wij als commissie maar eens een officiële reactie van Defensie vragen op de meest recente analyses van de heer Boeder, om te beginnen met zijn marktanalyse.

De heer Van der Staaij (SGP):
Voorzitter, dan de vraag aan de heer Boeder. Ik kom terug op de kwestie waarover al eerder is gesproken, namelijk dat er nog te veel risico’s kleven aan het JSF-project, omdat er nog maar weinig testvluchten hebben plaatsgevonden. Daar wordt tegen ingebracht dat het nu juist kenmerkend is voor dit nieuwe vliegtuig dat wij veel verder zijn in het gebruik van simulatoren. De digitale expertise is dus veel meer benut. Wat is zijn reactie op de tegenwerping tegen zijn punt dat de klassieke testvluchten eigenlijk veel minder van belang zijn op dit moment dan in het verleden?

De heer Boeder:
De heer Van der Staaij vraagt naar het testen en de teststrategie. Dit jaar heeft met name de Amerikaanse rekenkamer sterk de vinger gelegd bij een risicovolle teststrategie. Inderdaad wordt gezegd: wij hebben veel meer simulatoren. In hele JSF-gebeuren wordt 83% niet meer door vliegtesten geverifieerd. Er is een aantal parameters en indicatoren. Er zijn eisen waaraan men moet voldoen. Slechts 17% wordt door vliegtesten geverifieerd. Het is interessant, te kijken hoe een en ander wordt gedaan in de overige 83%. 19% van al het testwerk wordt alleen gedaan met zogeheten bureautesten. Dat wil zeggen dat enkele mensen kijken of de berekeningen die eraan ten grondslag liggen, realistisch zijn en of de modellen et cetera kloppen. In dit geval is geen sprake van simulatie, maar van doorrekeningen door een derde en bezien hoe realistisch een en ander is.

De heer Boeder:
Als wij een fysiek product hebben — en ik heb voldoende ervaring om dit te kunnen beoordelen — zullen wij altijd in de praktijk beproeving moeten doen. Autofabrikanten gebruiken uitgebreid simulatoren. Stel, iemand koopt bij een fabriek een auto die hij heel graag wil hebben. Deze auto heeft op de testbaan 100 uur gereden, laten wij zeggen 8000 km. Niemand kan zich voorstellen dat de fabriek dan al met de productie begint; dat is ongekend. Ook fabrikanten van auto’s en landbouwwerktuigen gebruiken uitgebreid simulatoren, maar nemen daar toch geen genoegen mee. Ik noem een heel concreet voorbeeld. Op 3 mei 2007, op de negentiende testvlucht, kwam de F-35A naar beneden zeilen met een ernstige storing. Een aantal maanden heeft men deze verborgen proberen te houden. Dit was voor mij de aanleiding om met dit project te starten. Het toestel heeft maanden aan de grond gestaan. Wat moest herontworpen worden? Het elektronische deelsysteem met zogeheten actuatoren. Dat is een revolutionair systeem. Ik heb op Farnborough iemand opgezocht van Moog, de fabrikant. Ik heb hier heel gedetailleerd naar gevraagd, ook naar de manier waarop men dit beproefd had. Omdat het vliegtuig voor het eerst snelle rolls ging doen en sneller achtereenvolgende bewegingen maakte, brak er een draadje, waardoor kortsluiting ontstond. Dat was in het simulatiemodel niet voorzien. Aldus mijn zegsman bij Moog. Testen blijft dus heel hard nodig bij de productie van elk fysiek product.

Kesteren - Op vrijdag 2 december 2011 werd de heer Wellink, voorheen president DNB gehoord door een parlementaire enquetecommissie. Hij meldt dat de kredietcrisis van 2008 noch door hem, noch door de rest van de wereld op enigerlei wijze is voorzien
Deze parlementaire enquetecommissie probeert uit te zoeken, los van partijpolitieke overwegingen wat er is gebeurd in 2008. Om lessen te trekken voor de toekomst. In het landsbelang.

Op dezelfde vrijdag 2 december 2011 raakte wereldwijd bekend dat vice-admiraal David Venlet, projectdirecteur van het JSF project openlijk toegeeft dat het JSF project in ernstige crisis is en dat deze projectcrisis naar zijn oordeel veroorzaakt is door de “vergissing” om ontwikkeling, testen en productie elkaar te laten overlappen. Enkele dagen later leidt dit in onze Tweede Kamer tot debat en Kamervragen.

Gisteren zijn de achterliggende details onthuld in een rapport “For Official Use Only – US Only”. Onze “beste bondgenoten” houden bepaalde zaken voor US ogen “only”. Helaas voor hen heeft de Amerikaanse organisatie POGO het rapport inzake de ernstige JSF ontwerpproblemen op het web gezet: 17 Megabyte onthullende informatie over de ernstige problemen door de overlap van ontwerp, testen en productie.
U kunt dit rapport downloaden: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review. Elke deskundige zal schrikken van de inhoud.

Crisis met diverse ernstige gevolgen

Een crisis in het JSF project is echter een crisis in een militair-industrieel project waarin het gaat om een immens bedrag van vele honderden miljarden euro’s defensiegeld. Een crisis met ernstige gevolgen voor de toekomstige veiligheidssituatie in de Westerse wereld, immers de JSF zou de ruggengraat zijn, de basis van het luchtwapen in vele Westerse landen vanaf 2013. Het betekent een bestaanscrisis voor tientallen bedrijven binnen de Westerse defensie industrie, met alle gevolgen van dien voor werkgelegenheid en strategische positie, indien dit project mislukt. Hoe zullen er ooit nog 4500 JSF’s worden verkocht? Hoe zullen de 850 miljoen euro in “ontwikkeling” worden terugverdiend door de Nederlandse industrie? Wat moet onze Koninklijke Luchtmacht met 2 “testtoestellen” uit voorseries, die niet representatief zullen zijn voor echte productietoestellen en die bovendien technisch en qua levensduur problemen zullen geven?

Voor overlap testen en productie vooraf aanhoudend gewaarschuwd

Deze crisis was echter wel voorzien door kritische deskundigen, die het JSF project nauwkeurig analyseerden. Mr. Michael Sullivan van de Amerikaanse Rekenkamer heeft tussen 2007 en 2009 herhaaldelijk ernstig gewaarschuwd voor de overlap tussen ontwikkeling en productie.

Deze website – JSFNieuws - heeft intensief en continu van november 2007 tot en met mei 2011 intensief voor onder andere dit risico gewaarschuwd. Door mij is aan leden van de Tweede Kamer is in 2008, 2009 en 2010 bij presentaties en tijdens een zogeheten Ronde Tafelgesprek en tevens middels talloze publicaties nationaal en internationaal hierop expliciet gewezen. Zeer nadrukkelijk heb ik dit als kernrisico benoemd: de overlap tussen ontwikkeling en productie.

Gebrek aan competentie of gebrek aan integriteit?

Mijn vraag is: hoe is het mogelijk, dat personen werkzaam bij Defensie DMO/Projectgroep PV F16; hoe is het mogelijk dat ingeschakelde experts van NLR en TNO of vanuit onze defensie industrie deze herhaalde en expliciet onderbouwde risico’s volstrekt zijn genegeerd als essentiële risico’s?

Was dit gebrek aan competentie en professionaliteit? Of was hier sprake van een risicovol gebleken tunnelvisie? Dat is een andere vorm van gebrek aan competentie. Of – en we stellen de vraag maar eens voorzichtig: was er rond de beslissingen inzake de JSF een gebrek aan integriteit bij de betrokkenen, anders gezegd, was er sprake van vormen van belangenverstrengeling.
Vervolgens is de vraag: hoe kunnen we hieruit lessen trekken als samenleving voor de toekomst, ook voor andere grote projecten en los van partijpolitieke overwegingen?
En hoe dwaas zijn we als samenleving om op de JSF dwaalweg voort te gaan en de belangen van onze Koninklijke Luchtmacht daarbij op te offeren aan een alleen op geld beluste defensie industrie zonder oog voor onze werkelijke belangen?

Auteur: Johan Boeder; 14 december 2011

Bronverwijzingen inzake waarschuwingen overlap testen en productie

Johan Boeder - “JSF hit by serious design problems” in Defense Aerospace van november 2007 en Defence Industry Daily december 2007.

Johan Boeder – Presentatie voor leden Tweede Kamer Vaste Kamercommissie Defensie op 22 mei 2008 getiteld “Trein naar Venetië, Droom of Drama”, met name pagina 19 en 33.

Johan Boeder – Ronde tafel gesprek Tweede Kamer inzake Vervanging F16 op 6 april 2009, waarin de overlap tussen ontwerp en productie nadrukkelijk aan de orde is gesteld. In een vervolgpublicatie zullen we de relevante citaten publiceren.
Onder Kamerleden en pers verspreid samenvatting met kernpunten onder de titel “Winnaars keren terug. Nieuwe feiten, nieuwe wegen”.

Johan Boeder – Briefing actuele status JSF project voor leden Tweede Kamer Vaste Kamercommissie Defensie op 17 februari 2010, getiteld “Is er al licht aan het einde van de tunnel?”, met name pagina 9, 10 en 11

Al deze presentaties en documentatie is gestuurd aan alle leden van Vaste Kamercommissie voor defensie, ongeacht politieke achtergrond en (in Engelse vertaling) aan tientallen defensiejournalisten, alsmede politieke en militaire medewerkers van defensie organisaties en defensie ministeries in de USA, het VK, Nederland, Italië, Denemarken, Noorwegen, Canada en Australië.
Als zodanig zijn dus tientallen mensen wereldwijd op relevante posities op gedocumenteerde wijze geattendeerd op de risico’s.

Washington - This morning, three publications reported more (and important) information about a report submitted to Acting Acquisition Czar Robert Kendall in November about the F-35.

This “Quick Look Report” was previously reported by Bloomberg News (Tony Capaccio). Today’s articles expand the coverage of the contents of the report. These articles by Jason Sherman and colleagues at Inside Defense, Bill Sweetman of the Ares Defense Technology Blog, and Bob Cox at the Fort Worth Star Telegram are below.

The new revelations are numerous and significant enough to call into question whether F-35 production should be suspended–if not terminated–even in the minds of today’s senior managers in the Pentagon.

The revelations include, but are not limited to “unsatisfactory progress and the likelihood of severe operational impacts for survivability, lethality, air vehicle performance, and employment.”

Performance vis-à-vis so called “legacy” aircraft is seriously questioned, and the individual deficiencies are sometimes so remarkable as to call into question the competence of the designers at Lockheed-Martin, to say nothing of the cost to repair the deficiencies.

For example, the naval variant is now incapable of landing or carriers due to the inability of the arresting hook to capture an arresting cable on the carrier deck. And, there are more hard to conceive deficiencies, including airframe buffeting at different angles of attack.

Moreover, as the report points out, these problems are appearing only after the easy phases of the test flights. The more exacting/demanding test flights are yet to even start. What unpleasant surprises do they hold?

The report frequently repeats the assertion that nothing so serious was found to “preclude further production.”

Read the report and decide for yourself if the report supports that conclusion, or actually the reverse. In fact, the oft-repeated assurance that nothing too serious is uncovered was, in fact, added on by some in a rather pathetic attempt to convert this report into mush.

Source: Center for Defense Information.

Thanks to POGO, find the full report at:
US Department of Defense; 29-nov-2011; F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review

Other sources:
Aviation Week - Bill Sweetman - 13-dec-2011; “JSF - What’s really happening”

EL SEGUNDO, Calif., May 27, 2011 /PRNewswire/ — Wyle has played a significant role in assessing noise exposure for the East and West Coast basing of the U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II (aka Joint Strike Fighter) aircraft.

Wyle supported TEC Inc. in developing the F-35B West and East Coast Basing Environmental Impact Statements, which evaluated the environmental effects associated with the proposed replacement of aging F/A-18A/C/D Hornet and AV-8B Harrier II aircraft with new F-35B aircraft at West and East Coast Marine Corps facilities. The Department of the Navy recently issued Records of Decision on the Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for the basing of the F-35B Lightning II aircraft. This clears the way for the basing to be completed as planned.

Wyle played a significant role in this effort through the development and application of advanced noise modeling tools that account for the flight and performance characteristics of the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) vehicle technology. Wyle engineers worked closely with the U.S. Marine Corps to develop F-35 operational and flight performance profiles and applied advanced computer models to assess the noise effects of proposed F-35 operations.

“This project demonstrates how advances in modeling technology coupled with a strong understanding of the operational environment are important to addressing advanced vehicle platforms such as the F-35 aircraft in a manner that is both compliant with National Environmental Policy Act requirements and responsive to DOD mission needs,” said Joe Czech, Wyle’s program manager.

Wyle produced cumulative noise footprints of the F-35B and combined those results with noise footprints of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft such as the F/A-18 Hornet and AV-8B Harrier II for several alternatives involving Marine Corps Air Stations in Miramar, Calif.; Yuma, Arizona; Beaufort, South Carolina; and Cherry Point, North Carolina.

Wyle also applied its airspace models to predict noise exposure resulting from F-35 operations in special use airspace and employed supplemental tools and metrics to assess potential community impacts in terms of speech interference, sleep disturbance and potential for human hearing loss.

Wyle continues to play an integral role in assessing the environmental effects of next-generation vehicles both in support of the vital mission of the U.S. military, as well as the environmental sustainability of the National Airspace System under the NextGen initiative.

“We are proud to be in a position to help ensure the environmental compatibility of future DOD basing requirements and fleet modernization efforts,” said Jawad Rachami, Wyle’s director of operations for Environmental and Energy Research and Consulting unit. “The combination of technical expertise and institutional knowledge possessed by our staff in this area allows us to deliver effective and reliable solutions that safeguard the DOD mission while protecting the environment.”

Wyle is a leading provider of high tech aerospace engineering and information technology services to the federal government on long-term outsourcing contracts. The company also provides biomedical and engineering services for NASA’s human space missions; test and evaluation of aircraft, weapon systems, networks, and other government assets; and other engineering services to the aerospace, defense, and nuclear power industries

Source: Dan Reeder; Press Release Wyle; 27-May-2011

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, PATUXENT RIVER, Md. (AFNS) — Air Force maintainers are getting hands-on experience with the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter here.

Seven Airmen from the 33rd Fighter Wing arrived here recently to spend 75 days gaining firsthand experience maintaining the F-35B and F-35C variants, while those aircraft continue flight test and evaluation.
Lockheed Martin is scheduled to deliver the F-35A to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, later this year.
“It is beneficial working around the F-35B and F35-C variants,” said Master Sgt. Timothy Weaver, a crew chief assigned to the 33rd Fighter Wing. “With this being a joint program, we learn a lot about how each branch handles maintenance. We are learning how the Marines operate, how the Navy operates, and sharing how we operate.”

The F-35C is distinct from the F-35A variant with its larger wing surfaces and reinforced landing gear for greater control in the carrier-takeoff-and-landing environment.
However, the three variants are similar enough that the visiting maintainers will benefit from performing basic maintenance, such as refueling, launch and recovery, and tire changing — all functions the Navy considers day-to-day maintenance, Sergeant Weaver said. “The C and A variants have a lot of the same systems, but some of the parts are in different locations,” Sergeant Weaver said.

The Eglin AFB maintainers volunteered for this assignment, and Sergeant Weaver said his team looks for any opportunity to get their hands dirty, and when they can’t, they are watching and gaining knowledge. “There is always work going on,” he said.

Source: US Air Force Official Website; 27-May-2011

Robert Haddick in Foreign Police; May 27, 2011:
The troubled and long-delayed F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program came under renewed scrutiny this week. The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and many foreign partners plan to buy thousands of the fighter-attack jets over the next two decades to replace a variety of aging aircraft, but the development schedule of the stealthy fighter has slipped five years to 2018 and the projected cost to the Pentagon for 2,457 aircraft has ballooned to $385 billion, making it by far the most expensive weapons program in history.

Air Force officials themselves may now doubt the wisdom of the size of the commitment to the F-35. According to a recent Aviation Week story, Air Force Undersecretary Erin Conaton placed new emphasis on the importance of the Air Force’s next-generation long-range bomber. With procurement funds sure to be tight in the decade ahead, Conaton hinted that the Air Force may have to raid the F-35’s future budgets in order to help pay for the new bomber.

Read more “Foreign Policy: The Jet that ate the Pentagon”

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter came under blistering criticism Thursday at a US Senate House Armed Services Committee hearing for ongoing technical problems, for schedule delays and cost overruns that have nearly doubled the cost of each plane and a threatening deadly price-quantity death spiral.

Senator John McCain of Arizona, the panel’s top Republican, warned for the fact that, “…after almost 10 years in development and four years in production, according to outside experts, the aircraft’s design is still not stable, manufacturing processes still need to improve and the overall weapon system has not yet been proven to be reliable”. And “Notably, it has taken Lockheed about 15 years and cost the taxpayer $56 billion to produce and deliver nine of 12 test aircraft. Over that period, Congress has authorized and appropriated funds for 113 F-35 jets. Lockheed has, however, delivered just 11.”

McCain sharply questioned the cost figures and said “Some of us saw this train wreck coming. (See: LINK, 2008 early warnings”) (…) “Lockheed Martin has done an abysmal job.” (…) It seems to me [prudent that] we at least begin considering alternatives”

Read the full statement and questioning of John McCain (Rep-Arizona):

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing and our continued oversight over this incredibly troubled defense program.
This hearing furthers this committee’s obligation to the American taxpayer to ensure that we are training and equipping our fighting men and women in the most fiscally responsible manner possible and that every effort is being made to eliminate waste and unnecessary
costs wherever possible.

I look forward to the testimony of all of our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Questions of Senator John McCain during the SASC Hearing about the F-35 of May 19, 2011:

Question Senator McCain:
I am sure you understand the frustration that members of this committee feel because we have received testimony after testimony over the 10-year period that you are describing that things were going pretty well, that we were pretty well on track, that yes, there were some cost overruns. And in all candor, we had to rely to some degree on the GAO for the facts, and many of us—or at least some of us—saw this train wreck coming which has led me to your comment that right now—is this accurate from what you said? Right now it is not an affordable program and the sustainment costs are not affordable. Is that correct?

Answer Dr. Carter:
That is correct. If we live the estimates, we cannot afford to pay that much. I do not think we have to live those estimates, and our objective is to make sure that those estimates do not come true and that we do have an affordable program.

Question Senator McCain:
It seems to me we have to start at least considering alternatives. If the situation right now is not acceptable, we have to do two things, it seems to me: make it acceptable but also think of alternatives if we cannot do that.
I guess, Dr. Gilmore, did I hear you say the previous plans under your area of supervision were ‘‘not credible’’?

Testing JSF not only “checking design” - high regression factor

Answer Dr. Gilmore (Pentagon Director Operational Test and Evaluation):
Well, first, I advise on developmental testing. My focus is operational testing. So I am not actually responsible for planning the program.
But what I did do, when I first took office, is take a look at the planning factors that were being used. For example, there are planning factors for reflying sorties, test sorties, when you do not get all the information that you originally hoped you would get when
you fly a sortie in the test aircraft. And there are planning factors for what are called regression sorties. That is, you have made a change to the aircraft. For example, they are making changes in the flight control system now in order to deal with something called
transonic wing roll-off, which is an unexpected loss of lift on one wing in the transonic regime where models cannot predict very well what the chaotic air flow is. So you make a change to the flight control system software. You want to go back and refly previous
points you have already flown to make sure you understand the behavior of the aircraft. That is a regression sortie.
The original plans for refly and regression—the original planning factors were 15 percent and 20 percent, 15 percent for refly and 20 percent for regression. Now we stand, as a result of the technical baseline review, at 35 percent and 66 percent. So that is one of the reasons that we now have 14,000 hours in the flight test program as opposed to 8,000 hours before all of the restructuring. That is just one example of assumptions that were made that were clearly out of line with our experience with programs like F–18E/F and F–22. Now, you want to be somewhat aggressive. You do not want to put yourself in a position of inevitably repeating mistakes that were made before, assuming that you will repeat those mistakes. But you can see that those planning factors were well out of line with historical experience.

About the troubling software development

Question Senator McCain:
It is too bad that we cannot, Mr. Chairman, ask those people who made these estimates and made assumptions that were made before this committee to explain that. But probably would be a waste of time.
I do not know if it is Ms. Fox or Mr. Van Buren. According to the GAO, software providing essential JSF capability is not mature and releases to the test program are behind schedule. Is that you, Ms. Fox?

Answer Mrs. Fox (Pentagon CAPE -Cost Estimates):
That is our understanding, sir. The software is behind, yes. (…) Sir, I do not have an answer for what we do. We are absolutely tracking it. I know that the program office is on it. The software development is proving to be much more difficult, as I said, even than CAPE estimated originally.

Answer Dr. Gilmore (Director OT&E):
Senator, one of the reasons that the software is behind schedule—Ms. Fox already mentioned one. It is a hard job to develop all this mission systems software. The mission systems software by source lines of code in Joint Strike Fighter is going to be between two and three times the number of source lines of code in the F–22. So this is a very complex job. We are just beginning.
One of the reasons that the achievement of mission systems flight test test points is behind schedule is because we have right now one dedicated mission systems flight test aircraft. Two or three of the other aircraft can do mission systems testing, but a couple of those aircraft are STOVL aircraft and right now they are being used primarily for STOVL flight sciences testing. There are two additional Air Force variant aircraft that have just been delivered that can do mission systems testing, but they are not going to be able to start doing that for about 4 months because they are going to be used to do what is called a maturity demonstration in order to enable training to start using unmonitored flight later this year down at Eglin.
So the problem is we only have one dedicated mission systems flight test aircraft. In another 4 or 5 months, we will have three, and that may enable us to catch up and drop the next block of software later this year as planned. It is planned in November. According
to my estimates, it may slip a couple of months. But right now, we are limited by test aircraft.

Questions and answers Mr. Michael Sullivan, US Government Accountability Office

Question Senator McCain:
Senator MCCAIN. How long, Mr. Sullivan, have you been tracking this program?

Answer Mr. SULLIVAN (US Government Accountability Office US-GAO):
I have been tracking it on and off for probably 10 years, but solidly for probably the last 6 or 7.

Question Senator MCCAIN:
So, given that experience, what is your degree of optimism that the sustainment costs can be brought under control and the cost overruns can be brought under control? What is your overall assessment of the prospects?

Answer Mr. SULLIVAN (US-GAO):
I think what we have seen from GAO’s perspective is for years what we thought were some fairly significant risks went unaddressed. For example, the Mid- Course Risk Reduction Program that took place in the mid 2000s we thought added more risk. It didn’t reduce risk and, therefore, added more cost to the program.

Question Senator MCCAIN:
And you testified so before this committee?

Answer Mr. SULLIVAN:
Yes, we have. And we made recommendations to the department, beginning in 2001, when we were talking about technology maturity, all the way through until—I mean, we made many recommendations that they should reduce their ramp-up rate because they weren’t ready to go to production.
Now all these things have come to pass, and they have come home to pass probably more inefficiently than if it would have been planned better in the first place.
But I would say with the beginning of the Nunn-McCurdy breach, when we had the Nunn-McCurdy breach and they came in and did the analysis, I think that they have done a pretty good job of being a lot more candid. They have got a lot more actual data
to bring into it now. Now, of course, it resulted in yet again another pretty significant cost increase, both to RDT&E costs and procurement costs, and significant schedule delays. But I think what we got in the last 15 months with this review that has gone on, and I think what Admiral Venlet referred to, is we have got a lot more sense of the systems
engineering knowledge that we need. And I think we have reduced risk a lot, and they have an estimate now that at least it is an estimate.

Question Senator MCCAIN:
Again, given your long experience, would you believe that perhaps at least alternatives need to be considered?

Answer Mr. SULLIVAN.
I think alternatives should always be considered. That is a little bit out of my, you know, my bailiwick. But yes, I think it is reasonable to assume that alternatives should always be considered, especially for our National security interests.

Lockheed Martin’s Tom Burbage under fire

Question Senator MCCAIN:
Mr. Burbage, Mr. Sullivan has just testified that they alerted the Congress and, I am sure, you of these significant risks, which, Mr. Sullivan’s testimony, were unaddressed for
8 or 9 years. What is your response to that?

Answer Mr. BURBAGE (Lockheed Martin):
Well, sir, the process on this program is complex. It is challenging. We have lots of independent looks at the program. We try to accommodate those independent looks as we can within the constraints that we operate in, and those are annual budgets and annual schedule constraints. Can we accommodate all of them? No.

Interruption Senator MCCAIN:
Annual budgets? You have exceeded your annual budgets by almost double.

Answer Mr. BURBAGE:
Well, sir, we have a set of requirements we are designing the airplane to meet. We mature that design as we go forward in time. We then bring the design into production. We then test the design. We don’t have full knowledge of how that is going to unfold. And
as it unfolds over time, we accommodate the different risks and challenges that come up.
Now the contract geometry is established upfront to accommodate the fact that there will be unknowns in this process, and we work our way through those.

Question Senator MCCAIN:
You know, but the sad part about that is that we sit here, and contractor and Department of Defense come over and tells us this is how much it is going to cost your taxpayers. And consistently—this isn’t unique—we find cost overruns with no
incentives to bring those cost overruns under control because they are ‘‘cost-plus contracts.’’ Nowhere in our economy do we have costplus contracts except in Defense, that I know of.
And yet Lockheed Martin is doing pretty well. Do you recall what their profits were in 2010?

Answer Mr. BURBAGE:
No, sir. I don’t.

Question Senator MCCAIN:
Probably, maybe you could submit it for the record? But I know that there has been a handsome return to the shareholders, but there hasn’t been a handsome return to the taxpayers. And if I convey a sense of frustration, it is because I have been a member of this committee, and I at least initially accepted the testimony of the Department of Defense and the program managers.
And consistently, the GAO has come forward with testimony saying that would contradict that, and now we find ourselves in a situation where previous witnesses say that sustainment costs are unacceptable, and the present rate, the weapon system is not affordable.
So I guess my question is, is that when you entered into the original contract with DOD, did you anticipate these kinds of cost overruns, breach of Nunn-McCurdy?

Answer Mr. BURBAGE:
No, sir.

Questions and answers Admiral Venlet, JSF Program Office

Question Senator MCCAIN.
Admiral, since the 2-year extensive review of the programs over the JSF has estimated it cost about 80 percent more than when the program started about 10 years ago, what can you tell the committee to give us confidence that the unsustainable cost growth we have seen in the program is now ending?

Answer Admiral VENLET (JPO):
Sir, the cost position in the situation of the program and Nunn-McCurdy was judged to be, as you said, 80 percent higher. That was on a path that was failed, basically. It did not have the realism in it. That is why the cost to bring this capability to bear was underplanned, both in content and in how it was estimated to be in price.
The hope for discipline going forward is it was a very serious commitment by the Defense Department to commit these resources of this extra $4.6 billion, not an easy thing, not taken lightly. Very seriously understood by me, when I brought that recommendation
forward. And I told Dr. Carter that it was my estimation that this change and this adjustment to the program had an ability to absorb the learning that remains and the number of flight tests and the years of continued development that should because of that grounding in realism and refly rates, capacity to do software, resource the helmet
issues that have been discussed, would have a high confidence of delivering within that timeframe and within that dollar amount.
Now it is not a given that it will. It requires to deliver particularly in the software area. From today, from the day I got here until the day the program declares its development complete, software will be the highest risk and the most intense focus of the program.
In parallel with this resourced and planned with realism, and it must come, the cultural change to never lose that grasp on the systems engineering processes. If we stray from that, we will go back to the old ways, and we will not live to this plan. That is a determination that those here and those that follow us must not lose to deliver this program.

About the doubled Operating and Support Cost

Question Senator MCCAIN:
I just have two more quick questions, Admiral. One of them is why are the sustainment costs for this system so much higher than others, and what can be done about that?

Answer Admiral VENLET:
Yes, sir. In the sustainment costs, the striking estimate that we are facing right now is a buildup of factors that what we believe today about the size of the manpower that will be required to sustain this aircraft, the number that we will own, the number of hours per month that we will fly them, which goes into the fuel cost, the price of the aircraft drives the estimated— (Interruption Senator MCCAIN. The price of fuel is the same for every aircraft.) - Yes, sir. Yes, sir. But the size of the fleet— 2,400 of these would be more than the F–18 fleet, the F–15 fleet.

Question Senator MCCAIN.
So you are saying that the F–18 sustainment costs are less because there are fewer of them?

Answer Admiral VENLET:
Only one factor, sir. Now I am going to complete the factors that are in the estimate now. My duty for the service chiefs and the Secretaries are to illuminate them the consequences of those choices.
So how many that we have, where we bed them down, how many bases, how many support equipment sets, simulators that we need, the number of maintenance technicians we believe are going to be required.
My focus this year, if 2010 was the year we focused on the development program and the manufacturing plan, this is the year we were focusing on needs estimates and these parameters, and I need to illuminate for those leaders what those drivers are and then bring them forward, bring forward to them some choices to make to make those go down.

Question Senator MCCAIN.
Well, I would have hoped that since we are in the 10th year of this program that some of those decisions would have been made a long time ago.
My final question is what degree of confidence do you have that the Marine Corps version can get off probation?

Answer Admiral VENLET.
Sir, I have high confidence that the Marine Corps STOVL will succeed this period of scrutiny. Every technical issue—and they are principally the propulsion system integration,
the ones that Dr. Carter spoke of. Every issue within our view today has an engineering solution to lead the STOVL to the air worthy, flight clearance for unmonitored operation by the fleet. I have high confidence that we will get the STOVL to its initial sea trials before the end of this year. I have high confidence that we will be able to achieve a flight clearance from the Naval Air Systems Command for a conventional monitored mode of flight first while we prove out the engineering solutions I spoke about for the STOVL mode, and that will help the Commandant immensely, sir.

Senator MCCAIN.
Thank you. I thank the witnesses for their patience.

Defense News reports about the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, reporting about the testimony of Pentagon procurement chief Ashton Carter:

“Over the lifetime of this program, the decade or so, the per-aircraft cost of the 2,443 aircraft has doubled in real terms, that’s what it’s going to cost if we keep doing what we’re doing. That’s unacceptable. That’s unaffordable. (…..) Nobody is going to pay that bill, it’s way too high. (…) Having the thing costs much more than buying the thing. Seventy cents of the cost of every program is having it, 30 cents is getting it.”

Source(link): Defense News; 20-May-2011 DoD: Operating Costs Biggest Threat to F-35

Kyodo News Agency reports Japan may dromp F-35 from shortlist for the Japanese fighter replacement competition to replace the F-4EJ Phantom II due to the continued delays in the F-35’s development plan. The Kyodo report was based on diplomatic and defense sources.

Source (link): Reuters; 20-May-2011; “Japan may drop F-35 from shortlist of next mainstay fighter

Ashton Carter, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Pentagon cannot afford to pay for the F-35 under present estimates.

Source (link): Washington Post; 19-May-2011 “Pentagon official, lawmakers says estimated costs of jet fighter unsustainable”