Jan 21 2016

First launch of AIM-9X missile from F-35 fighter

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

An F-35 fighter jet from the 461st Flight Test Squadron launched an AIM-9X missile for the first time over the Pacific Sea Test Range on January 12, 2016.

The flight sciences aircraft, AF-1, of the Joint Strike Fighter Integrated Test Force, was piloted by David Nelson, the Lockheed Martin chief F-35 test pilot at Edwards Air Force Base.

The AIM-9X is an advanced infrared missile and the newest of the Sidewinder family of short-range air-to-air missiles carried on a wide range of fighter jets.

The missile was launched at 6000 feet.

The shot paves the way for the F-35 to utilize the weapon’s high off-boresight and targeting capabilities, increasing lethality in the visual arena.

US Air Force, press release; 21-Jan-2016; 412th Test Wing Public Affairs

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Feb 03 2015

F-35 design problems: list of high priority modifications………..

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Aanschaf JSF, Ontwikkeling JSF

Do you want to know the plain truth about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?
Don’t you like believing F-35 crtitcal journalists?
Do you prefer optimistic US generals?
Or the industry public relations machine?
Or do you like the honey-sweet words of the politicians, with their own agenda?

Read from the REAL world, a summary of the inconvenient truth about the F35 Joint Strike Fighter design problems. An official US Department of Defense document (5 Mb download, see page 215-230) is telling you the real story in an overview of about 230 high-priority modifications………… How many pages is the list of low-priority (design) problems?
And what about Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2016? And the taxpayers in Australia, The Netherlands, Norway, Italy, UK, are they paying the modifications of their AirForces F-35s?

Planned Modification costs US Air Force onl during FY2014-Fy2019:
- Modification of in-service F-35A CTOL aircraft USAF: US$ 1.389.368 million (1.39 billion)
Total delivered F-35As USAF about 100 units, this means modification costs amount US$ 13 million/aircraft.

The list in the orginal US DOD document:


This effort (MN-F3516) funds retrofits due to concurrency changes to correct deficiencies discovered after DD-250 of the last aircraft in a given Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lot. This includes modifications required to extend aircraft service life currently limited by low-life parts, and relieve capability limitations driven by concurrency of production with development. The concurrency funding line will procure the highest priority modifications from the Tri-Service Modification Prioritization List, as soon as they become supportable from an engineering, production, and installation standpoint. The list is vetted by the Services and Partners every 6 months to ensure the list accurately reflects existing requirements as well as emerging issues. Per-kit costs will vary for each modification being implemented, and in some cases will also vary for aircraft from different LRIP lots to implement an individual modification. For FY16, the highest priority modifications will directly support USAF IOC, Block 3i, and tactics development. The following modifications will be the highest priorities for accomplishment throughout the F-35A CTOL fleet using funds from this Budget Activity.

TI Number Mod CR Title
TI-0000-1089 CR-021694 LRIP 3 Aux Air Inlet (AAI) Door Install
TI-0000-1324 CR-022656 Structural Cracking of Aft MLG Door Drive Link U-Joint
TI-0000-0116 CR-011738B Full Qualified Clutch Cooling Fan
TI-0000-0367 CR-014114C Engine Trailer Adapter Kit - FS556 Interface, J27006/J27007
TI-0000-0121 CR-014289B Lift Fan Exhaust/Inboard Weapon Bay Door Interference
TI-0000-0396 CR-014289C WBDD Limit Life, ECU
TI-0000-0655 CR-014819D EO DAS Center Fuselage Vibration Testing
TI-0000-0373 CR-015026B Aux Air Inlet Lock Actuation Mechanism
TI-0000-0423 CR-016270C Bleed Air System Ducting Design
TI-0000-0099 CR-017502 J75503 Wrap Around Adapter Set
TI-0000-0683 CR-017534&B Rev-HT Bearing Issues
TI-0000-0463 CR-017913B Support-Fairing, Mid, LH/RH
TI-0000-0058 CR-018274 Back-Up Radio Tray Clearance
TI-0000-0968 CR-018524 Material Removal Allowance for IPP Blocker and Screen
TI-0000-0027 CR-018524A IPP Exhaust (STOVL)
TI-0000-0138 CR-018564B Wingtip Light Improvement For FAA Compliance
TI-0000-0825 CR-022768D LEF Improvements
TI-0000-0031 CR-018835 Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) Motor
TI-0000-0015 CR-018836 Stress Failure of Hydraulic Tube Support Bracket
TI-0000-0063 CR-018838A Bootstrap Accumulator Redesign
TI-0000-0045 CR-019003 CTOL/STOVL MLG SDD & LRIP Part Number Rolls
TI-0000-0056 CR-019004B IPP Controller Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0057 CR-019005 STOVL GO3 Control Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0117 CR-019107 CTOL Trestle Inst Cotter Pin
TI-0000-0165 CR-019135B R3 Float Valve with Mechanical Thread Locking
TI-0000-0231 CR-019340B PTMS EHA Cooling Orifices - CTOL & STOVL
TI-0000-0101 CR-023102A Lift Fan Inlet Door Full Qualification Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0245 CR-019469C Antenna Switch Unit
TI-0000-0264 CR-019516A PTMS Controller
TI-0000-0124 CR-019533 Controller, Motor Pump Qual Failure (GMMP)
TI-0000-0561 CR-019683E STOVL FS 496 Bulkhead Trunnion
TI-0000-0280 CR-019841 Cockpit Panels Pushbutton Switch Simultaneity
TI-0000-0398 CR-019930C Arresting Hook Aft Door Spring Damper Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0375 CR-019979 STOVL IRCM Doors Bushing to Lug Interference
TI-0000-0208 CR-020003A CTOL Arresting Gear Push Rods
TI-0000-0424 CR-020066A Firewall Shutoff Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0477 CR-020097A CTOL EHAS Panels
TI-0000-0875 CR-020189 CV Main Landing Gear Retract Actuator
TI-0000-0130 CR-020289 Emergency Control Valve Qual Failure
TI-0000-0575 CR-020289A ULF & 3BSD Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-0608 CR-020396D Fwd Upper Engine Mount (CTOL)
TI-0000-0456 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 450
TI-0000-0457 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 472
TI-0000-0458 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 518 (Upper)
TI-0000-0460 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 556
TI-0000-0432 CR-020397A Short Life - CTOL Wing Forward Root Rib
TI-0000-0602 CR-020398A Brake Control Unit (BCU)
TI-0000-0538 CR-020593 EHA Flaperon Support Equipment Locations
TI-0000-0363 CR-020636A TRS Component Changes from Qual Test Failures
TI-0000-0412 CR-020680B Wing Lighting Controller Salt Fog Failure
TI-0000-0331 CR-020725 WBDDS RGAs Limited Life - Change Request Approval
TI-0000-0654 CR-020726A IDMS Connector Ref Des Swap
TI-0000-0673 CR-020743B Ordnance Quick Latch System (OQLS) Clip Lock
TI-0000-0137 CR-020793 Pump, Motor GND Maint Qual Failure
TI-0000-0132 CR-020907B Valve, Mechanical Sequence - T Qual Failure
TI-0000-0811 CR-021167A 2WSH54239: CV Rear Spar
TI-0000-0810 CR-021168 2WSH64241: CV Frame
TI-0000-0817 CR-021170 2WSH44162: CV RH Tail Hook Longeron
TI-0000-0631 CR-021180 Countermeasures Doors & NNMSB/WSESRB Concerns
TI-0000-0263 CR-021181 Power Panel 1, 2, 3
TI-0000-0544 CR-021194 Limited Life STOVL Mid Fairing Longeron
TI-0000-0558 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: Keel Beam RH
TI-0000-0559 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: NLG Drag Brace Ftg
TI-0000-0566 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: Support, Otbd, FS 502.65 LH/RH
TI-0000-0617 CR-021194 Limited Life STOVL STA 3/9 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0545 CR-021217 Limited Life STOVL Nacelle Vent Inlet
TI-0000-0564 CR-021217 STOVL Forward Root Rib (L6/U6)
TI-0000-0808 CR-021259 Weapons Bay Door Uplock Sealing
TI-0000-0098 CR-022768D CTOL Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-0910 CR-021395A PCD EU Cooling Rework
TI-0000-0607 CR-021434 Limited Life CTOL STA 3/9 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0135 CR-021459B Engine Driven Pump Life Limit
TI-0000-0895 CR-021557A Arm Disable Current Leakage Path Correction
TI-0000-0848 CR-021621 2CSH20930 Splice, Fuel Floor/Root Rib, FS 402, RHS/LHS
TI-0000-0377 CR-021694 Aux Air Inlet Door Redesign
TI-0000-0845 CR-021891 CV VT Aft Moment Fitting Life Limited Structures Part
TI-0000-0626 CR-021905A SMSFRIU SDD/LRIP Arm Disable Input
TI-0000-0998 CR-021915B CTOL and CV Refuel System Mod
TI-0000-0897 CR-022058 Roll Control Nozzle Door Redesign
TI-0000-0495 CR-022105F OBIGGS & Pressure/Vent Changes for Lightning Protection
TI-0000-0133 CR-022196A Filter Module, Pressure Qual Failure
TI-0000-1011 CR-022226A L-Band Pre-Selector (LBPS) Calibration for Mode 5
TI-0000-0802 CR-022695 CTOL Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-0703 CR-022515A Roll Post Door Actuator Life Limitation
TI-0000-1101 CR-022647A GMMP Controller EEE outage
TI-0000-1092 CR-022666 Landing Taxi Light Redesign
TI-0000-0119 CR-022736 MWARS Replacement
TI-0000-0866 TBD Production Ejection Seat (-0023)
TI-0000-1099 CR-022841B ATQA Mounting Bolt Interface
TI-0000-0064 CR-022872 Counter Measures Door Control Valve on AF:6
TI-0000-0158 CR-022877 WBDD Flexible Cable Re-design
TI-0000-0191 CR-024623 270V BCCU
TI-0000-0574 CR-023121B/D Electronics Units Modifications
TI-0000-1485 CR-023282CA F1 Feed Tank Gasket
TI-0000-1540 CR-023332A CV Rudder Hinge 2
TI-0000-1372 CR-023355D EW Block-2 DRFM Module Firmware Issue
TI-0000-1652 CR-023599 Rudder Slider Hinge Wear
TI-0000-1654 CR-023712 CV Right Hand (RH) Center Fuselage Avionics Bay Floor
TI-0000-2548 CR-023712 CV Center Fuselage FS 402 Outboard Joint Limited Life
TI-0000-2551 CR-024031 L-Band Power Amplifier (LBPA) Update for LINK-16
TI-0000-1709 CR-024114 Carrier Variant Marker Beacon Antenna
TI-0000-2513 CR-024153 CV IPP Shear Web Limited Life
TI-0000-1207 CR-024162 Vehicle Management Computer (VMC) Electrical Connection Issue
TI-0000-0441 CR-20773A CTOL FS 594 Centre Arch Low Life
TI-0000-1549 CR-023540A Firmware Update for AMS Cartridge Reset SPAR
TI-0000-0405 CR-23769 EDU Random Vibration Failures
TI-0000-0702 CR-24090 CV Fwd Arresting Gear Door Actuator Life Limitation
TI-0000-2554 CR-24872 J84001 Fiber Optic Inspection Set Extension Handle DR?s
TI-0000-0122 TBD 28V Battery and Charger Changes
TI-0000-0129 TBD MLG Control Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0709 CR-022768D HT EHA Block Change for LRIP 4
TI-0000-0282 TBD Update to Audio Control Electronics (ACE) Unit
TI-0000-0469 TBD Composite BOS 2ZCH42000-0002 Assemblies
TI-0000-0583 TBD CTOL/STOVL Rudder EHA Design Change
TI-0000-0906 TBD NLG Lug Inspection and Support Stiffener
TI-0000-1097 CR-022972 Ball Joint Salt Fog Failure
TI-0000-0913 TBD LEFAS PDU Resolver and Rotor Shaft Seal Life
TI-0000-1113 CR-024000 AESG Power Connector Rating (Generator)
TI-0000-1256 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear Drag Brace Door Cracking
TI-0000-1396 TBD HTCA with End Gland Material Issue
TI-0000-0336 CR-024982 Panoramic Cockpit Display (PCD) Major Variances - DU
TI-0000-0343 CR-024982 Panoramic Cockpit Display (PCD) Major Variances - EU
TI-0000-0480 CR-025000 ICC Qual Issues
TI-0000-2784 TBD CNI 3A & 3B Integrated Backplane Assembly (IBA) Upgrades
TI-0000-0221 TBD DAS Refuel Lights Lenses
TI-0000-0406 CR-025271 Ordnance Hoist System (OHS) Hoist
TI-0000-1102 CR-022481B BH-1 Weapons Bay Doors
TI-0000-1472 TBD Gun Port Door Threads in Bearing Issue
TI-0000-0329 CR-021982 Refueling Bay and Nozzle Clash LRIP 1-3 Modification
TI-0000-0781 CR-023432 3BSM NBD - Assembly Changes
TI-0000-1446 TBD CV Fuel Dump
TI-0000-0908 CR-023802 STOVL Fuel Dump (CCDD LRIP2-051)
TI-0000-1000 CR-022481 Inboard Weapon Bay Door Flipper Door Design Change
TI-0000-1060 CR-022121 Final Finishes
TI-0000-1078 CR-025006 AF1 Nacelle Insulation
TI-0000-0180 TBD CTOL Fuel Floor Tooling Holes - Bay 207 to Gun Bay
TI-0000-0787 CR-024068 HMDS Path Forward
TI-0000-1048 CR-023982 Panoramic Cockpit Display-Electronic Unit (PCD-EU)
TI-0000-1062 TBD CV Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-1063 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-0284 TBD STOVL Canopy frame
TI-0000-0316 TBD CTOL FS 496 Bulkhead Trunnion
TI-0000-0321 TBD Lift Fan Exhaust Door Aft Uplock Hook Failure
TI-0000-0467 TBD Fuel Floor - FS496-556, LH
TI-0000-0468 TBD Fuel Floor - FS496-556, RH
TI-0000-0486 TBD Short Life - STOVL Inner Wing FS518 Lower Bulkhead
TI-0000-0543 TBD Path Forward for Outboard Rib at Station 2 and 10
TI-0000-0556 TBD STOVL Short Life Parts: Aft Mid Keel
TI-0000-0638 TBD STOVL BL 0.0 Web Fwd Upper Engine Mount Support
TI-0000-0813 TBD CV Life Limited Structures Part - LH/RH Pylon Sta 3 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0815 TBD 2WSH24212 CV FWD Upper Engine Mount
TI-0000-0816 TBD 2WSH34496 - CV FS 496 Blkhd Station 6
TI-0000-1440 TBD STOVL Thrust Mount Shear Webs
TI-0000-0723 TBD EOTS PBS Startup Timeline
TI-0000-0055 CR-019070 IPP Bay Vent Fan Electrical Bond
TI-0000-0281 CR-020226 Hoist Point Cover FIP Proposal
TI-0000-1023 CR-022936 Roll Nozzle and Duct Bay - BALD Sensors redesign
TI-0000-0193 CR-021921B EW Gain State Control Logic Error
TI-0000-1365 CR-022721A Cat Launch Shock Exceeds INS PBS
TI-0000-0448 TBD Add -0007 ASSCA/-0006 ATQA To Aircraft TVE
TI-0000-0842 TBD 2ESH10095 CV HT Rib 5 Life Limited Structures Part
TI-0000-0976 TBD BF6 and BF8 RCS ATP
TI-0000-0819 TBD Liquid Cooling System Cart - Facility AC Power Interface
TI-0000-1134 TBD Cabin Pressure Tester
TI-0000-1198 TBD HT Heating
TI-0000-0361 CR-023382 Vertical Tail 575 Fitting
TI-0000-0386 CR-025191 Fuel System Major Variance for LRIP 1-Signal Amplifier
TI-0000-0516 CR-022972 AAR Probe Weak Link Adaptor Re-design
TI-0000-0576 CR-020289A Refuel Probe/Tailhook Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-0578 CR-020289A Aux Inlet Door Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-1082 TBD Power Panel 1 & 2 Random Vibration Failures
TI-0000-1203 CR-021217 Life Limited 402 Frame
TI-0000-1289 CR022737 US16E Ejection Seat/MWARS Retrofit Configuration Proposal
TI-0000-1421 TBD STOVL Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-1422 CR-021388A STOVL Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-1483 TBD Power Panel 3 Random Vibration Failures - Second Failure
TI-0000-1486 CR-023838 STOVL FS 503 Frame/IPP Shear Web Durability Test Failure
TI-0000-1515 CR-024000 ESG Service Life (Generator) -0003
TI-0000-1551 TBD 28V Battery Full Qualification
TI-0000-1589 CR-023300 Hydraulic System Single Point Failure
TI-0000-1786 CR-023729 FS-402 Frame (TIN-075)
TI-0000-1857 TBD 2GHH42033 Time Delay Valve - Fully Qualified Part
TI-0000-2467 CR-025204 CTOL FS 503 Frame Limited Life
TI-0000-2468 CR-025204 CTOL IPP Shear Web Limited Life Discovery
TI-0000-2641 CR-024341 STOVL - Short Shank Condition, Engine Access Panel
TI-0000-2674 CR-24794 Cracking of Bifurcation Seam Treatment
TI-0000-2892 CR-025079 BF5 IRCM Hinge to Drive Link Clash
TI-0000-1552 TBD 28V BCCU Lightning Compliance
TI-0000-2682 TBD AR Probe Light
TI-0000-0884 CR-024000 AESG - Material & Workmanship
TI-0000-1142 TBD Missionized Gun System Jumper Panel Hoses and Drain Seal
TI-0000-1796 CR-025271 Ordnance Hoist System (OHS) Motor
TI-0000-2506 TBD Gun Port Blast Mislocation
TI-0000-2546 TBD Weapon bay light departing aircraft during flight
TI-0000-2833 TBD Gun System Muzzle and Purge Door Time Out
TI-0000-0387 CR-016910 Fuel System Major Variance for LRIP 1 - Dive Rate Performance
TI-0000-1161 CR-22656 STOVL Aft MLG Door Cracking
TI-0000-1518 CR-024193 PAO Cooling Orifices In Center Fuselage Cold Liquid Loop
TI-0000-1783 TBD Canopy Boot Cracking
TI-0000-2633 CR-024265 Flaperon Blade Seal Buckling
TI-0000-2672 TBD Radome Shroud Gapping/Trimming
TI-0000-2909 CR-025167 IPP Bay High Flow Air Duct Separation
TI-0000-2931 TBD CV NLG Drag Brace Cylinder and Steering Motor
TI-0000-0236 CR-019412 FPS Fire and Bleed Leak Controller (FBLC) Redesign
TI-0000-0260 CR-016633C Canopy Actuation System
TI-0000-0738 CR-025142 Modified Fuel Dump Valve (T28a)
TI-0000-0772 TBD PTMS Turbomachine/ACCM Cable Interface Changes
TI-0000-0327 TBD STOVL High Sea State Fuel Stowage - Rev B to CR-016712A
TI-0000-0737 TBD IPP Purge Issue Due to Low Fuel Shutdown
TI-0000-1650 CR-022737 MWARS for Production Seat
TI-0000-1653 CR-23490 Ground Maintainance Valve Deletion to Prevent PAO in Cockpit
TI-0000-2416 TBD CV Drag Strut - Alt Gear Extension
TI-0000-2450 CR-023901 Bleed Air Sensor Fitting Galling
TI-0000-2635 TBD CV NLG Interference Problems - OBOGs routing
TI-0000-2725 CR-024162 Vehicle Management Computer (VMC)
TI-0000-2834 CR-024904 Boarding Ladder Cracks
TI-0000-2889 TBD WBDDS Supplier Disclosure on Lower Breakaway Torque
TI-0000-0771 CR-16464B Install Battery into CNI Rack 3A and 3B
TI-0000-0945 TBD CTOL Audio Control Electronics (ACE) In-Flight Refueling
TI-0000-1056 CR-016660C RADAR 1A & 1B Racks -0002 Cut-in
TI-0000-2818 CR-025046 EOTS LoS Pointing Angle
TI-0000-1093 CR-023616 CV Arresting Gear
TI-0000-0358 TBD Production Ejection Seat (-0021)
TI-0000-0514 TBD Lift Fan Inlet Maintenance Fix
TI-0000-0579 TBD Auto Pilot
TI-0000-1520 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear Aircraft Integration
TI-0000-1761 TBD HT EHA Solenoid Valve (SOV) Qual Test Failure
TI-9999-0655 TBD EO DAS Center Fuselage Vibration Testing
TI-0000-0730 TBD CV Rudder EHA
TI-0000-0833 CR-021053 Short Shank Condition on Engine Inspection Panels
TI-0000-1122 TBD LEFAS Foldbox Lug Cracking
TI-0000-1192 TBD CTOL Thrust Mount Shear Web
TI-0000-1494 TBD PTMS Turbomachine Configuration to Correct Qualification Failures
TI-0000-1499 TBD FS 472 Bulkhead Crack BH-1
TI-0000-1541 TBD CV HT LOWER SKIN BOLTS SD-2013-010
TI-0000-1649 TBD CV LEFAS Asymmetry Brake Lug Cracking
TI-0000-1655 CR-024025 STOVL RH and LH Rear Spar Lower Flange Fatigue Cracks
TI-0000-2423 TBD CV Lower FS 518 Design Change
TI-0000-2448 CR-023966A CV Thrust Mount Shear Web - Service Life
TI-0000-2670 TBD Durability Findings 2013 - Bulkhead FS 496
TI-0000-2813 TBD Durability Findings - FS 450, 472, 556, 518 Lower and IRCM Fitting
TI-0000-2814 TBD Durability Findings 2013 - FS 575 Center Arch Frame
TI-0000-1104 TBD CTOL Ventilation Leakage from Bay 207L
TI-0000-0992 CR-013553 Outboard Vertical Tail Seal Redesign
TI-0000-0904 CR-021759 Backup Radio Guide Pin Misalignment
TI-0000-1053 CR-022138 Fire Suppression Bottle Low Clearance
TI-0000-2675 TBD Roll Nozzle Bay - BALD Sensors - Supplier Disclosure
TI-0000-2921 CR-025116 Gun Vent Door Unpainted Brackets
TI-0000-0485 TBD J12003 Ejection Seat Stand Design Issues
TI-0000-0660 TBD J26007 LF Driveshaft
TI-0000-0799 TBD Canopy Sling
TI-0000-1337 TBD DR 1-2076141 Tool Boxes not within weight standards
TI-0000-1338 TBD DR 1-2565051 Tool Set Shipboard FOD Hazard
TI-0000-1629 TBD Deployable Mission Rehearsal Trainer #1
TI-0000-1658 TBD Changes to Support Turning on AMC’s Algorithms in ALIS
TI-0000-2440 TBD J26035 Adapter, Drive Shaft Compression Galling issue
TI-0000-2699 CR-023093C Fibre Channel Switch Design Issues -0005
TI-0000-2797 TBD SE Weight Label and Forklift Provisions
TI-0000-2954 TBD STOVL NLG EEE Failure
TI-0000-1408 TBD AEL, Aft Sector
TI-0000-2865 TBD TR2 - SP-SPIO Issue
TI-7777-0004 CR-013644D MLG Strut Redesign
TI-7777-0007 CR-015718A OBOGS Plenum HEPA Filter Provisioning
TI-7777-0010 CR-016660B Radar Harness Redesign
TI-7777-0024 CR-018697 Gun Gas Purge & Gun Port Door Actuators
TI-7777-0031 CR-018544 Brake Control Electronic Unit Update
TI-7777-0042 CR-018487A Return Fuel Cooler HX Coating
TI-7777-0057 CR-018378 Nacelle Fan - Full Qualified Configuration
TI-7777-0077 CR-009382B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Rack Strut
TI-7777-0081 CR-014768E 270V BCCU Change
TI-7777-0083 TBD EHAS/LEFAS -0011 EU & Rack Config Update
TI-7777-0084 CR-016708A ACCM Filter Pin
TI-7777-0085 CR-016758A Replacement of Door Actuator Lock Assemblies
TI-7777-0087 CR-016909A Flaperon EHA Pump Design Change
TI-7777-0089 CR-017095 Avionics Bay Environmental Seal Change
TI-7777-0093 CR-017505 Flow Sensor EMI/Vibration
TI-7777-0095 CR-017773 Manual Drive Unit
TI-7777-0097 CR-017937A IEU Lightning Compliance
TI-7777-0098 TBD CTOL Structure Redesign for Updated Gun Loads
TI-7777-0101 CR-15956A NLG Down Lock Actuator
TI-7777-0102 CR-016633C Canopy Actuation System
TI-7777-0106 CR-016912 WBD Fwd Uplock Roller Bracket

Milestone/Development Status
DEVELOPMENT STATUS/MAJOR DEVELOPMENT MILESTONES For the F-35 program, the discovery of new concurrency changes phases out with the completion of SDD.

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Jul 19 2014

The same old story over and over again

Gepubliceerd door Christiaan Meinen onder Global F35 News

The NOS (Dutch Broadcasting Organisation) has the following story. On television they show a big smiling Maxime Verhagen, former minister of Foreign Affairs (CDA) now appointed as special representative to get as many orders on the JSF program as possible for Dutch industry. Of course he is very positive but he also exaggerates enormously about the possible values. Some of the “facts” of this broadcast:

• 27 Dutch companies have made it to generate work from the JSF program (0:22)
• Fokker: for 40 JSF per year they build parts (0:26)
• Aeronamic has an order ( worth € 220 milj) work for at least 50 people (0:32)
• There will be more work, € 8 to € 9 billion with hundreds of jobs. (0:36)
• Maxime Verhagen: After building there also will come future contracts for the maintenance work also worth € 10 to € 20 billion

I would like to ask Mr. Verhagen some key questions: On what grounds where those prognoses based? These where the figures based on the business case of the Dutch Air Force buying 85 JSF not 37.

Another quote of mr Verhagen: If you don’t invest.. you won’t receive anything. (0:45)

Can we expect the US to give us the same amount of orders? What about some non-partnernations willing to aquire the JSF with demands of large production participation? Like Japan, South-Korea and Israël? Howe come they didn’t invest a billion euro’s in this program and still receive orders far more wort than ours? While they even order in the same amount of aircraft (arrount 40 each?) And what about those figures and orders we see sometimes in the Dutch News. Stories about new orders, signature signing of orders. All celebrated but not always clear if it’s a new one… or one already arranged long time ago… but celebrated as a new victory (for marketing purposes ofcourse).

Repeating old contracts and framework agreements with each small successor agreement, if re-extracted billions turnover ……….
The annual PV F16 allow hitherto SALES tens of millions to the recognition of the “JSF Business Case” (which is not MARGIN = value) show per year.
Super nice of course …….

But Aeronamic works for Airbus; and work would have been if we DO NOT F-35 bought; simply because they are innovative.

October 2009
THE HAGUE - Stork Fokker’s flaperons, movable flaps on the wings, producing for American combat unit JSF. For this purpose, Tuesday (October 6) signed a contract with aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin.
(and even at least 4 times, and so on)

Aeronamic (part of the work is outsourced to Romanian branch)

November 17, 2010
Aeronamic has a contract for the supply of the so-called Air Management System for Turbomachinery energy on board the aircraft.

May 2013
Honeywell, a company that for years Aeronamic Siezen recent works, signed an agreement for the construction of Terminal Power Management Systems (PTMs) for half of the total number of building F-35’s. “The system regulates the energy system aboard the new American fighter. It is an order of 500 to 600 million and provides 50 to 60 of our people for thirty years working on “The deal goes through, but under one condition., The Dutch government should proceed to purchase the F-35. “How many devices they buy does not matter. If only they buy. ”

July 2014
Production of 220 million and 50 men work.

How often do we have to repeat this??

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Jul 16 2014

F-35 Returns to Limited Flight, Officials Rule Out Farnborough

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

WASHINGTON, July 15, 2014 – While the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter has returned to limited flying, it will not be appearing at the Farnborough International Airshow in the United Kingdom, Pentagon Press Secretary Navy Rear Adm. John Kirby said during a Pentagon news conference today.

Return to flight after grounding

The F-35 fleet was grounded July 3 in the wake of a June 23 engine fire on the runway at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Navy and Air Force airworthiness authorities approved the F-35’s return to flight yesterday.

The return has a limited flight clearance that includes an engine inspection regimen and restricted flight rules, Kirby said, adding that the limits will remain in place until the root cause of the engine fire is identified and corrected.

While the investigation is not yet complete, “we haven’t seen anything that points to a systemic issue across the fleet with respect to the engine,” the admiral said.

Even with the return to flight, U.S. and British officials decided not to send Marine Corps and Royal Air Force F-35B aircraft across the Atlantic to participate in the Farnborough airshow. “This decision was reached after a consultation with senior leaders and airworthiness authorities, despite the decision by airworthiness authorities to clear the aircraft to return to limited flight,” Kirby said.

While we’re disappointed that we’re not going to be able to participate in the airshow,” he added, “we remain fully committed to the program itself and look forward to future opportunities to showcase its capabilities to allies and to partners.”

Strict rules of flight resumption

Under the rules of the flight resumption, the F-35s are limited to a maximum speed of Mach 0.9 and 18 degrees of angle of attack. They can go from minus 1 G to a 3 G’s, the admiral said. After three hours of flight time, each front fan section of each engine has to be inspected with a borescope. “That was a pretty significant limitation in terms of being able to fly them across the Atlantic,” he added.

This is not the first aircraft to have problems like this, Kirby noted, and it won’t be the last. “New programs often go through these kinds of challenges,” he said. “We’re confident that we’re going to get through this.”

US Department of Defense; press release; 15-Jul-2014; by Jim Garamone, DoD News, Defense Media Activity

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Jul 16 2014

Pentagon Press Briefing F-35 end of grounding and flight restrictions

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

Transcript of the Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Admiral Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room about the F-35 to return to flight and its missing of the Farnborough Show.

(…/…) My second comment is about the F-35. As you know, yesterday, the airworthiness authorities for the U.S. Navy and Air Force approved the F-35 to return to flight. This is a limited flight clearance that includes an engine inspection regimen and a restricted flight envelope, which will remain in effect until the root cause of the June 23rd engine mishap is identified and corrected.

That said, I can confirm that the Department of Defense in concert with our partners in the U.K. has decided not to send Marine Corps and U.K. F-35B aircraft across the Atlantic to participate in the Farnborough air show. This decision was reached after a consultation with senior leaders and airworthiness authorities, despite the decision by airworthiness authorities to clear the aircraft to return to flight — to limited flight.

When we — when we operate aircraft, we look at many factors, to include operational risks, the weather, ground time, maintenance issues. All of these factors were weighed appropriately in making this difficult decision. And while we’re disappointed that we’re not going to be able to participate in the air show, we remain fully committed to the program itself and look forward to future opportunities to showcase its capabilities to allies and to partners.

As Secretary Hagel has made clear, safety as always remains our top priority. And we’ll continue to provide you up-to-date information as we can and as it becomes available.

With that, I’ll take your questions. Bob?

Q: Just — based on what you just said about the F-35, it’s not clear to me why you — why you would be unable to send it to England if it’s — you’re able to fly them again.

REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, again, I said there’s a limited flight envelope here. So there’s a couple of things. One is…

Q: What is that?

REAR ADM. KIRBY: Okay, I can give you those parameters, but let me — before I do that, let me get to the bigger question here. It is — it’s a restricted return to flight, so it’s not completely unrestricted. And I’ll give you the parameters in just a second.

Secondly, there’s a timing issue here. The air show started already and just the physical act of getting there makes timing critical. And I think nobody in senior leadership wanted to rush to do this for the sake of the air show. Not that the air show’s not important, not that we didn’t want to go, but I think everybody believed given the parameters around the restrictions on the flight, the flight envelopes, and given the timing, that this was the most prudential and safe decision. And as I said before, Secretary Hagel has made it pretty clear that safety is going to be paramount here.

So on the — on the flight envelope restrictions, right now, the aircraft are limited to a max speed of 0.9 Mach, 18 degrees of angle of attack. They can go from minus one to a positive three Gs and a half a stick deflection for rolls.

More critically, after three hours of flight time, each front fan section of the — of each engine has to be inspected with a borescope. So after every three hours of flight time, you got to do a borescope inspection of the front fan section of the engine. That was a pretty significant limitation in terms of being able to fly them across the Atlantic.


REAR ADM. KIRBY: Well, no, I mean, that’s — that’s — that — of all those restrictions, that’s probably the most important one when it came to making the decision about whether you’re going to fly them across the Atlantic, because after three hours of flight, they have to be inspected. So I don’t know. Did that — did that get to your question?


Q: (OFF-MIC) more broadly a lot of critics are going to seize on this as a big defeat for the F-35.


Q: Could you put in perspective — it’s going to an air show to entertain flight enthusiasts. Is this a — what kind of a setback is this to the overall program’s perception?

REAR ADM. KIRBY: It — first of all, we remain committed to the program. We’re actually glad for the news today to be able to get the aircraft back in the air, even if it is limited. We fully expect to work our way through this problem and restore the full operational capability in the near future.

This by no means should signal any lack of commitment to the F-35 or to its future in the U.S. military or in those militaries of partner nations that want to — that want to purchase it. It’s the — it’s the next-generation fighter aircraft, and we remain committed to that.

Not the first aircraft to have problems like this. It’s not going to be the last. New programs often go through these kinds of challenges. We’re confident that we’re going to get through this.

And I would also add that, you know, after all the inspections and the work — now, I want to caveat this, because the investigation is not complete yet, but we haven’t seen anything that points to a systemic issue across the fleet with respect to the engine. Again, that can change. I want to caveat that right off the bat, but the point is that — that leadership feels increasingly comfortable and confident in working the aircraft back to flight.

Q: (OFF-MIC) did Secretary Hagel call his counterpart in the U.K. to let him know this is not coming over?

REAR ADM. KIRBY: We have — we have — I mean, as I said at the outset, the U.K. authorities were completely in consultation with this decision and helped make this decision. So we’ve been in constant touch and communication with them throughout this thing. Yeah.


Q: Admiral, on the F-35 decision, can you please tell us when that was made, as quick — you know, as much as you know, and who actually made it? Did Secretary Hagel decide this or somebody in the program office at a lower level?

REAR ADM. KIRBY: The decision — the first decision was this morning. I think you saw my announcement about the return — the limited return to flight. That was made last evening. And then, you know, communicated to authorities there in the U.K. appropriately. So we were able to announce that this morning.

And then — and then the decision not to go to Farnborough was actually made within the last couple of hours. And, I mean, ultimately that decision for the Marine Corps variant fell to the commandant of the Marine Corps. For the U.K., obviously, for their own — and I don’t know exactly who in the — in the government at the U.K. made the decision for their — for their Bs [F-35B] but for us, the commandant ultimately made that decision and the secretary fully supports it.

And I would also say, as I said at the outset, the airworthiness authorities for the Air Force and the Navy also had a role in shaping that decision.

Q: Did the secretary have a veto that he chose not to use or did the commandant have the ultimate authority here (OFF-MIC)

REAR ADM. KIRBY: The secretary made it very clear from the very beginning that — that he was not going to push pressure on the airworthiness authorities or the services either way. His only — his only guidance was safety will be paramount. I don’t want safety to be — to be impaired at all here.

So he was — that was his only guidance. He trusts the service leadership and the airworthiness authorities to make the best decision, you know, based on what’s good for the aircraft and, more importantly, what’s good for the crew.

(end of excerpt)

U.S. Department of Defense; Press Briefing; issued July 15, 2014

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Jul 15 2014

F-35 Not Flying To Farnborough

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

FARNBOROUGH (UK) — The Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF will not be flying at the Farnborough International Airshow. This was announced by Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, to the media in an official press statement Tuesday a15-Jul-2014 in the afternoon.

Rear Adm. Kirby told the press: “I have to confirm that the Department of Defense — in close concert with our partners in the UK — has decided not to send Marine Corps and UK F-35 aircraft across the Atlantic Ocean to participate in the Farnborough air show. The decision was reached after consultation with operational commanders and air worthiness authorities, despite the decision by air worthiness authorities to clear the aircraft to return to flight. “.

There was huge disappointment among JSF program supporters, partner country offiicials, visitors and aircraft spotters at Farnborough, after days of rumours the F-35 would possibly arrive at Farnborough later this week.

Early Tuesday morning, is was leaked that the Pentagon would have ended the grounding order for the F-35 fleet, that was announced 3-Jul-2014 after the engine fire of 23-Jun-2014.

However some hours after the first positive news, a new disappointment followed. Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s acquisitions chief, told Defense News that there were strong restrictions, including a requirement for inspections for new damage every three hours of flight time and restrictions in the flight envelope (speed, power).

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Jul 14 2014

US DoD Official Discusses F-35 at Farnborough Airshow

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

WASHINGTON, July 14, 2014 – Safety is the first consideration in whether the F-35 Thunderbolt II joint strike fighter appears at the Farnborough International Airshow in England this week, a senior Defense Department official said today.

F-35 fleet grounded, safety first

The F-35 fleet was grounded July 3 pending an investigation of an engine fire that occurred June 23 on the runway of Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, told reporters at Farnborough that senior Air Force and Navy officers are assessing data to determine the root cause of the fire.

“Hopefully, they’ll be able to come to a conclusion and begin flying again, but we don’t want to prejudge that,” he said. “We don’t want to get ahead of it, and we put safety first.”

Even with setbacks like the grounding, the F-35 program is a much more stable program than it was four years ago, Kendall said. “We’ve got a lot more confidence in the design today,” he added. “We have the costs much more under control than we did four years ago.”

In 2010, the services were only about 10 to 15 percent into the flight test program. Today, it’s up to about 60 percent. “It is still a development program,” Kendall said. “We’re still finding things as we go through the testing phase. We’re still finding things that we
need to correct and fix, but it’s a much more mature design.”

Cost is a major factor

Cost is a major factor, and Kendall said the new program has brought expenses down, and expects to continue to do so. “We’re beating our own projections in terms of production costs year by year,” he said. “So the cost growth that plagued the program in the earlier phase of its cycle, I think, in the production side, is behind us.”

The goal, Kendall said, is to bring the cost of this aircraft down to where it is comparable to that of a fourth-generation aircraft by 2019.

“The biggest opportunity we have to reduce cost is probably in sustainment,” the undersecretary said. “We’re looking at that very closely. We were able to reduce our estimate for future sustainment costs by about 10 percent this year, but there’s a lot more work to be done there, and we think there’s a great opportunity there.”

All of the original partners in the joint strike fighter are still in the program, Kendall said, adding that there are two foreign sales candidates outside the partnership with more expected.

“The reason for that is very simple: this is a quantum improvement in air dominance,” he said. “It’s going to be an aircraft that will set the countries that have it apart from countries that don’t by a significant margin for the next few decades. So that’s why it’s such a valuable investment to us, and that’s why we remain committed.”

US Department of Defense; DoD News, Defense Media Activity; by Jim Garamone

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Jul 14 2014

Head Pentagon Acquisition Kendall says: “F-35 Fire Cause Not Systemic”

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

Breaking Defense reports:

LONDON: The head of Pentagon acquisition told reporters here today that “we do not see at this point what I call a systemic problem” resulting from the F-35A fire that led to the grounding of the fleet.

“We understand to a degree what happened here. The question is why did it happen,” according to reporting by my colleague Amy Butler of Aviation Week.

Kendall told reporters that blades in the engine’s low-pressure turbine and the surrounding cowl rubbed much more than is acceptable and a blade failed. That led to the fire.

Read more:
Breaking Defense; 13-Jul-2014; Colin Clark; “Kendall ID’s F-35 Fire Cause: ‘Not Systemic’

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Jul 12 2014

Italian company is building Dutch F-35 JSF stealth fighters

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

Lieuwe de Vries writes at “War is boring” about the Dutch visit to the Cameri F-35 FACO facilitiy in Italy:

Uh Oh—A Crappy Italian Company Might Build The Netherlands’ New Stealth Fighters……

The Dutch minister of defense recently attended talks in Rome to decide who would build nearly 40 F-35 stealth fighters for the Royal Netherlands Air Force. Lockheed Martin in the U.S. designed the single-engine, radar-evading jet, but the company licenses some of the actual manufacturing to foreign factories.
The Netherlands is considering tapping Italian firm Alenia Aerospace to make most of the Dutch jets, which could form the backbone of the RNLAF for many decades.

The choice is a potentially risky one. Alenia Aerospace is part of the Finmeccanica Group alongside companies such as AnsaldoBreda and AugustaWestland. Finmeccanica has a reputation for high-profile failures. And if it screws up the Dutch F-35s, an entire European air arm could be in jeopardy.

The FYRA train

When the Dutch national rail carrier Nationale Spoorwegen wanted trains to run on its new fast rail link to Antwerp and Brussels, it turned to AnsaldoBreda to produce the trains. (…..) Reports surfaced of serious manufacturing quality issues. Those few early trains suffered frequent outages, with as many as 80 percent of them being out of service at any given time.

The NH90 helicopter : Dutch Navy losing its wings

NATO established the Helicopter Management and Acquisition group to oversee design and production of what would become the NH90 helicopter, pictured below. Finmeccanica’s Augusta—which eventually merged with Westland—was responsible for building the 12 Dutch navy copies.
There were long delays. Helicopters finally began to trickle into service in The Netherlands and other countries in 2007, years late.
The Dutch national aviation research lab examined the NH90s and found construction and design errors. They ranged from a poorly designed tail structure to improperly applied or completely missing sealants. These errors reflect poorly on the quality-control procedures at Finmeccanica’s facilities.

This not necessarily spell trouble for the F-35……. Dutch Air Force losing its wings
To be fair, past problems with Finmeccanica Group projects don’t necessarily spell trouble for Alenia’s F-35 involvement. But they do seem to hint at a group-wide corporate culture that fails to promote quality.

Global Supply Chains are tricky
Alenia’s Dreamliner failure in particular is a worrying sign.

[JSF Editor’s note: also read this:
Randy’s Journal: Boeing 787 / Alenia
and this:
Big questions hang over Global Aeronatica; Alenia’s Dreamliner project ]

Read more (source):
War is boring; 9-Jul-2014; Lieuwe de Vries;
“Italian Company is building the Netherlands new joint stealth fighter (JSF)

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Jul 12 2014

A Big Week for the F-35?

Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Global F35 News

Even if the mainstream U.S. media has been late in coming to the story, the largest defense program in U.S. history is facing two critical events this coming week.

Failed to show up in United Kingdom

As major British media has been reporting for some time, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may be facing a major international marketing embarrassment: It has failed to show up for two of three scheduled (and much ballyhooed) public demonstrations in the United Kingdom. Now, it may miss the main event, a flying demonstration before the world’s aviation community at the Farnborough International Airshow, starting Monday. You see, the F-35 is grounded—again. An engine blew up on take-off at Eglin Air Force Base on June 23 and reportedly burned up much of the plane’s flammable, plastic composite rear fuselage and tail. No F-35s are flying until inspectors know what the problem is and can say it’s safe to fly—at least in the very limited regimes the F-35 has been cleared for. Moreover, even if the F-35 is released to participate at Farnborough, there may be a new problem: weather predictions for next week in England are not good, and the F-35 has real issues flying near thunder- and rainstorms; it even has problems with wet runways.

Next week: Approval of FY2015 Defense Appropriations bill

Stuck at home or coddled in UK hangars, the timing could not be worse for F-35 advocates. This Tuesday, the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC-D) will mark up its 2015 Defense Appropriations bill, and more than the usual routine approval of the Pentagon’s F-35 budget request is at stake. As pointed out in two timely commentaries (one by the Center for International Policy’s William Hartung and a second by Taxpayers for Common Sense’s Ryan Alexander), the House Appropriations Committee larded onto the already gigantic $8.3 billion request by adding four unrequested F-35s, costing an extra $479 million.

The four added planes are clearly at risk given the F-35’s self-embarrassment at Eglin, surely inspiring the F-35 talking points Lockheed is planting on the Members of the SAC-D well beyond their usual spinmeister fantasies on cost and performance. Worse, there could—at least theoretically—arise a critic of the F-35 in the membership of the SAC-D who might try to take real action on the F-35, beyond the rhetorical hyperbole that critics like Senator John McCain (R-AZ) have been hurling at the F-35. Imagine the shock and awe if some Member were to offer a meaningful amendment requiring the F-35 to be tested—actually imposing “fly-before-buy”—before a few hundred more mistake-laden jets are produced.

Hagel: F-35 is the future

Not to worry: the F-35 defenders are rushing to the rescue. Beyond whatever election year financing promises major F-35 contractors Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, and Pratt & Whitney may be distributing to keep the program on track, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has just completed a baby-kissing exercise for the airplane. Travelling to Eglin Air Force Base where that F-35 destroyed itself, Hagel declared “This aircraft is the future of fighter aircraft for all our services,” thereby removing any notions that his junket might have some useful purpose other than showing fealty to the beleaguered F-35 program. Any expectation that he went to Eglin to exercise oversight of the F-35’s recurring embarrassments, as one might expect from a functioning Secretary of Defense, has been thoroughly excised. That leaves it up to the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Once the Congress and Pentagon open their eyes in the endless F-35 drama? But when?

The SAC-D has many important defense spending decisions to make. None will be a better test of whether the committee is willing to conform DOD program ambitions to Pentagon budget realities than this point in the endless F-35 drama. Of course, the easy road beckons; defense business-as-usual will be happy to shower the Members with handsome signs of approval, material and otherwise.

Unfortunately, more of the same simply accelerates the decay of our defenses at ever-higher expense.

All eyes are turning to the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Defense Subcommittee. Thus far, political support for the F-35 has rolled over every ground truth, but realities like multiple groundings occurring amidst a continuing torrent of technical failures and cost overruns have a relentlessness all their own. Perhaps the only real question is when, not if, the politicians in Congress and the Pentagon will succumb to the inevitable tide. If next week does not end up as a tipping point for the F-35, it will come. It will come. And, that will be long before we buy the 2,433 Lockheed and its other boosters dream of.

Winslow Wheeler; Director, Straus Military Reform Project, CDI at POGO

POGO (Project on Government Oversight) is an US organisation and believes in transparency and accountability throughout the federal government. We work with whistleblowers and other inside sources, and access information through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), to shed light on the government’s activities. Our goal is not only to expose problems, but also to propose solutions and work toward their implementation

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